Russia’s way towards developing a “sovereign internet” – its effort to control and govern its own cyberspace – is not a abrupt reaction to western platforms or fresh geopolitical tensions. It is alternatively the consequence of a long and deliberate process of digital centralization. Over the past 2 decades, the Kremlin has gradually extended the same control it established over tv and print media into the online sphere. The current bans on western social media, restrictions on YouTube and promotion of state-backed alternatives represent the next phase of this ongoing effort to isolate and nationalize Russia’s digital space. This strategy reflects the Kremlin’s long-term nonsubjective of establishing informational sovereignty – not only to shield its population from external narratives but besides to centralize control over digital infrastructure.
Online control
In the early 2000s, only about 13 per cent of Russians were using the internet. This number was not significant, as most of the population inactive relied on tv as the main origin of information, a average the Kremlin had already begun to control by bringing the private NTV under state ownership. tv networks became 1 of the main tools for shaping political thought and securing electoral victories.
Less than a decade later, however, almost a 3rd of the Russian population was utilizing the internet, and its influence had become significant. During the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, for example, the country’s main search engine, Yandex, reported that the most-clicked news was about the Russia–Georgia war, overshadowing even the Beijing Olympic Games. This was a signal to the Kremlin. Authorities pressured Yandex to filter the news according to the government’s vision. At the end of 2009, Yandex sold its “golden share” to the state-owned Sberbank for 1 euro, giving the Kremlin decision-making power over the future of the net giant’s algorithms and business deals. The episode demonstrated to the Kremlin that digital spaces could amplify or undermine authoritative narratives faster than conventional media.
The situation intensified in the following years as the number of net users rose and the net became an alternate to state-controlled media – a place to access uncensored political views, share independent information, and coordinate initiatives. By 2012, more than half of Russia’s population used the internet, actively participating on social media platforms like Vkontakte, Facebook, YouTube, local news websites, and blogs. This online freedom of expression made the mass protests of 2011-2012 possible. In response, the Kremlin tightened its control by adopting the net “Blacklist Law”, government formally intended to defend children from offensive content, but in reality aimed at taking down any website opposing the government, frequently without due process. For Moscow, the protests underscored that digital freedom translated straight into political mobilization potential, making net governance not a method issue but a question of government stability.
The process reached its highest in 2019 with the introduction of the “Sovereign net Law”. The law aimed to guarantee that the Russian section of the net could proceed functioning even if disconnected from the global network. Officially presented as a safety measurement against possible US or European shutdowns of Russia’s access to global infrastructure, in reality it created fresh mechanisms of information control.
Under the law, net providers were required to install state-controlled equipment, giving authorities the power to monitor and filter online traffic in real time. This enabled selective blocking and throttling of platforms specified as social media networks and websites, and enhanced state surveillance, allowing authorities to identify and restrict VPN traffic, censor circumstantial content and disrupt access to abroad media. Unlike earlier censorship measures that targeted circumstantial content, the 2019 law institutionalized systemic control. It transformed net regulation from reactive blocking into an anticipatory model of governance, embedding state authority within the architecture of the Russian internet.
Acceleration of digital isolation
The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine provided the Kremlin with both a pretext and public justification for intensifying its online isolation. safety narratives reframed censorship as defence against “information warfare”, effectively normalizing digital restrictions in the eyes of many citizens. Since the invasion, the Kremlin blocked Facebook, Instagram, Twitter (now X), Discord, Viber, Snapchat, Signal and the gaming platform Roblox. In 2025, users in Russia experienced difficulties or interruptions erstwhile trying to make calls via WhatsApp, Apple Facetime and Telegram. Recently, customers were incapable to registry with Russian telephone numbers on these messenger services and government officials have hinted that both apps could yet be banned in the country. Even though these apps and services are banned or limited, people in Russia inactive usage them via VPNs. However, the Russian government is steadily taking steps toward a full cut off from abroad services.
The introduction of the “White List” a set of services and websites accessible even without an net connection is 1 specified step. Although the Kremlin claims it is simply a safety strategy for emergency situations, it resembles the beginnings of China’s Great Firewall, which blocks abroad websites and creates a separate online space for home users. From the start, Russia has developed its own alternatives to global platforms: VKontakte (alternative to Facebook), Yandex (alternative to Google search, maps, and Uber), Ozon and Wildberries (similar to Amazon and eBay). Recently, the government introduced the super app “Max,” primarily a messaging platform meant to replace WhatsApp and Telegram, but besides integrating access to government services – possibly allowing users to verify ID documents, pay utility bills and sign papers straight through the app. Russian authorities are aggressively promoting the Max messenger – state institutions, housing services, and schools are required to adopt it, since September 1st, all fresh mobile devices sold in Russia must have Max preinstalled. The app is heavy advertised by Russian influencers as well. Through Max, the Kremlin can gain full control over user data and communications. The measures besides reflect a strategical decoupling from western tech dependencies, aligning with Russia’s broader effort to accomplish technological self-sufficiency amid sanctions.
The bigger picture
Russia is actively moving towards digital isolation. The essential infrastructure already exists, and the country is modifying its digital systems to make the “Sovereign Internet” a reality. any services, however, are not well received by Russian users (even by pro-kremlin war correspondents and lawmakers) – specified as the YouTube alternate “Retube,” and the deficiency of a appropriate Instagram replacement. These 2 platforms are especially important: YouTube has around 95 million monthly local users and hosts voices of opposition, abroad channels and news agencies. The Kremlin has hesitated to full block YouTube due to the fact that it would besides disrupt another Google services, specified as cloud retention and the Android operating system. incapable to offer a viable alternative, the Kremlin alternatively throttles YouTube, making it increasingly hard to use.
In the case of Instagram, the Kremlin banned advertising on the platform. This step was aimed at controlling influencers who had previously been financially independent of the state, even erstwhile spreading Kremlin-aligned content. With advertising now banned, influencers must align full with government positions to keep income and visibility. No 1 can now gain popularity without Kremlin approval or participation in Kremlin-run social media platforms, forcing influencers to control to VK. The Kremlin has created a dependency: influencers now search cooperation with the state alternatively than independence. This not only strengthens government control over content but besides drives audiences to home platforms.
What’s next
Russia’s model increasingly mirrors China’s concept of cyber sovereignty, where state control over digital infrastructure is equated with national safety and political stability. Yet unlike China, Russia’s approach is reactive alternatively than strategical – a consequence to geopolitical confrontation, sanctions, and interior insecurity alternatively than a long-term plan to make a self-sufficient digital ecosystem. Beijing built its digital control on a foundation of technological innovation, home platform dominance, and carefully cultivated public acceptance of online surveillance. Moscow, in contrast, is attempting to impose isolation on an already globalized digital society, lacking both comparable technological capacity and the social consensus that legitimizes specified control.
Significant level of isolation seems to be an imminent result – it is only a substance of time before the Kremlin takes the final step. The infrastructure already exists, but adoption of local services is inactive limited, and many Russians stay dependent on abroad platforms, peculiarly Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram, where the content base is large and influential. Shutting down the global net entirely would entail tremendous material, administrative, logistical, and technological costs. Russia inactive depends on global net access for trade, technology development, and essential systems. Therefore, it is not a realistic scenario, even a Chinese level of isolation is doubtful. Unlike China, which centralized net gateways from the 1990s and can control access more easily, Russia has dozens of global transit points and hundreds of autonomous systems peering straight with abroad networks. This makes traffic control far more difficult, as there is no single “border” to enforce a firewall. Additionally, China benefits from strong local IT and manufacturing capabilities to build customized systems and devices – a capacity Russia lacks.
The current Kremlin approach brings Russia closer to models seen in Turkmenistan or Iran. Turkmenistan controls all traffic through a single state net supplier and a national gateway, with strict censorship and nearly all abroad sites blocked. Iran operates a dual-internet system: a national net providing local sites and apps at low cost or free, and a heavy filtered global internet. For Russia, the Iranian-style model appears more feasible, as it requires less technological changes, material investment and does not severely disrupt business, banking, investigation or global trade – while inactive achieving the Kremlin’s goals of controlling information, monitoring traffic and promoting home alternatives.
Even so, as the Kremlin continues to push local services and restrict abroad platforms, adoption will gradually follow. Over time, Russia may increasingly match the Iranian or Turkmenistan model of sovereign internet, with controlled home alternatives and restricted abroad access while balancing economical and technological dependencies. Further sanctions, infrastructure pressures or mass protests could push Russia toward stricter control resembling Turkmenistan or even China, measures that would require crucial material investment and public support, implemented gradually in a step-by-step process.
Beka Iromashvili is simply a final year MA student within the Central and east European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CEERES) programme jointly run by the University of Tartu, the University of Glasgow, and the Jagiellonian University. He is besides an editorial intern with New east Europe.
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